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Abstract:  In this paper I investigate whether, in market e quilibrium, one observes price 
dispersion and search when buyers intend to acquire several products whose price is unknown 
and exists a positive search cost. Although that seems fruitful, I prove that in market 
equilibrium it is not observed neither price dispersion nor search and shops act as if they 
where monopolists. Nevertheless, there is one property of the theory that is in accordance 
with empirical data, namely the continuous increase in the number and dimension of larger 
shops.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is an empirical regularity that in the trading of homogeneous goods there is persistent price 
dispersion and buyers search for the best price. This, however, is not explainable by the 
classical Arrow-Debreu theoretical framework. It looks straightforward that this empirical 
regularity is a consequence of the non-verification in true markets of the classical assumption 
of perfect knowledge, Simon (1955). In spite of this, within a theoretical framework where 
buyers are homogeneous and intend to acquire one product whose price is unknown, it results 
in a market equilibrium where there is neither price dispersion nor search. This result is valid 
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either when buyers follow the optimal sequential sample strategy, Diamond (1971), or the 
sub-optimal fixed sample size strategy, Vieira (2004). 
The reasons of that theoretical pitfall have involved substantial investigation dating back to 
Diamond (1971). One investigation path that seems to be fruitful is to consider that buyers 
search simultaneously several products (Burdett & Malueg, 1981; Carlson & McAfee, 1984; 
Gatti, 1999; McAfee, 1995). Nevertheless, in this work I prove that this multi-product 
investigation path is not as fruitful  as it seems. In concrete, I prove resorting mathematical 
formalization that Diamond (1971)'s result stands when the base model is extended to 
consider the multi-product market equilibrium. That is, i) there is no price dispersion;  ii) 
buyers do not search and iii) shops act as if they where monopolists. Additionally, I prove that 
in equilibrium all shops sell all the products. 
 
2. ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
Assumption 1. There are two products in the market, product 1 and product 2, being their 
marginal production cost zero; 
Assumption 2. There are N identical buyers that intend to acquire both products and M 
identical shops; 
Assumption 3. Prices affixed at each shop are unknown, being commonly assumed that they 
are independent extractions from a perfectly known distribution function; 
Assumption 4. A buyer must pay the search cost c to know the price of one product affixed at 
an aleatory selected shop and he/she must pay the search cost c + a to know both product 
prices, being c > 0 and 0 < a < c; 
Assumption 5. Buyers maximize an inverse utility function,  v(P1,P2), that is strictly 
decreasing with prices of products 1 and 2, respectively p1 and p2;  
Assumption 6. The search cost increases the products' acquisition price. Nevertheless, the 
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Assumption 7. Shops maximize the expected profit.   3
Definition 1. Pi
– is the smallest price and Pi
+ the highest price amongst all prices affixed at 
shops for product i.  
Definition 2. The market prices distribution function of product i is Fi(p). 
Definition 3. A "new" buyer is an individual buyer that did not acquired any of the products 
in a previous period. 
 
3. MAIN RESULTS 
Lemma 1. If the buyer search for product 1 (product 2) having acquired previously product 2 
at price p2, he/she will buy it when he/she finds a price smaller or equal to a reservation price 
P1* (P2*), unique for each p2; otherwise, he/she continues searching for product 1. The net 
expected utility of the search is equal to the utility of acquiring the good at the reservation 
price. 
Proof. If the buyer intends to acquire product 1, his/her decision problem, knowing the 
product 1 price affixed at one shop, p1, and having acquired the product 2 at the price p2 is 
modeled by: 
[ ] { } ) (., ; ) , ( max
) , (
) , ( 2 2 1
1
2 1
2 1 p V E p p v c
dp
p p dv
p p V + =             (1) 
In this expression and all the following, one dot represents a stochastic variable and  E 
represents the expected value of that stochastic variable. 
Assuming an exogenous reservation price  P1*, not necessarily optimal, it results, by 
forwarding the expression (1) one period ahead, the net expected utility of the search (net of 
the search cost): 
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This expression may be simplified, resulting: 
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In this expression,  [ ] ( ) ￿ -
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dx x f P p V E p x v  is the expected gain of the search 
and  c k  is the expected cost of the search, both in utility units. In order P* to exist and be 
unique, at the optimum the expected search gain net of search cost must be a maximum. 
Deriving expression (3), it results the first condition of optimization: 
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The second condition of optimization is verified by assumption 5: 
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Expression (5) and (6) guarantee that reservation price exists and is unique for each p2 and (5) 
guarantees that the net expected utility of the search is equal to the utility of acquiring the 
good at the reservation price. QED 
Note 1. I will show at lemma 7, that if there is no price dispersion, expression (6) has multiple 
solutions because  f1(x) is zero almost everywhere. Nevertheless, it will be seen that this 
exception is not of relevance. 
Note 2. As the order of products is arbitrary, this and other following proofs apply to both 
products. 
 
Lemma 2. If the buyers search for product 1 (product 2), intending afterwards to search for 
product 2 (product 1), he/she will buy it when he/she finds a price smaller or equal to a 
reservation price P1* (P2*), otherwise he/she continues searching. The net expected utility of 
the search is equal to the utility of acquiring both goods at the reservation prices. 
Proof. If the buyer intends to search product 1, the decision problem when he/she knows the 
product 1 price, p1, is either i) to acquire the product 1 at that shop and start searching for 
product 2 or ii) to continue searching for product 1. 
By Lemma 1, the i) expected utility is  *) , ( 2 1 P p v . Being so, the buyer decision model 
becomes: 
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In algebraic terms this problem is identical to problem (1) with P2* instead of p2, being the 
solution identical as well: 
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Expression (8) and (9) guarantee that reservation price exist and is unique for each P2* and 
that the net expected utility of the search is equal to the utility of acquiring the good at both 
reservation prices. QED 
Both note 1 and note 2 apply. 
 
Lemma 3. The reservation price is increasing with the search cost. 
Proof. It is intuitive that the expected utility of the search is decreasing with the search cost. 
Formally, as in expressions (2) and (7) the search cost in utility units, k c, is negative and 
) , ( 2 1 p p v  does not change with the search cost. Then, when search cost c in monetary units 
increases the expected utility of the search decreases. Therefore, the left-hand side in 
equalities (5) and (8) decreases, which implies that the reservation price of the searched 
product increases. QED 
 
Corollary 1. When the inverse utility function is convex (increasing to scale) the buyer may 
regret. When the buyer acquires one product and continues searching for the other one, 
he/she may regret of the acquisition. When, instead of acquiring the product where he/she 
finds an acceptable price, the buyer waits intending to recall it in the end, he/she may not 
recall it at all but, instead, restart searching for the first product. 
Proof. When the buyer searches for product 1, by lemma 1 his/her reservation price is 
conditioned to the price he/she will find for the product 2, as the search cost in utility units 
depends on it. Being so and as by lemma 2 he/she first decides as if the price of product 2 is 
P2*, after he/she resume searching for the product 1, he/she may find a price lower that P2* 
that decreases the search cost of product 1. This situation may occur when the inverse utility 
function is convex (increasing to scale). If cost decrease occurs, by lemma 3 it will decrease   6
the reservation price of product 1 so that the buyer may regret if he/she has already acquire 
the product 1 or, otherwise, he/she will restart searching for it. QED 
 
Lemma 4. When there is price dispersion, P i
– „ P i
+, and search cost is positive, then the 
reservation price Pi* is higher than Pi
–. When search cost is zero, the reservation price Pi* is 
equal to or smaller than Pi
–. 
Proof. By absurd reduction, when Pi* is smaller or equal to Pi
–, the left-hand side of the 
expression (3) becomes zero. Then the search cost must be zero so that the proposition is 
truth. In this way, when search cost is positive, Pi* must be higher than Pi
– and, when search 
cost is zero, Pi* must be equal to or smaller than Pi
– (see lemma 7). QED 
 
Lemma 5. If there is price dispersion, the optimal expected utility of the search is higher than 
the average (expected) utility less the search cost of the first visit. 
Proof. Rewriting expression (2) for product 1 it becomes: 
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In the right-hand side of this expression, Avg is the average utility less the search cost of the 
first visit. By Lemma 4, Pi* > P i
–, and assumption 5, the integral in the expression (11) is 
lower than Avg:  
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Substituting (12) in (11), it results  [ ] 0
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Avg P p V E . QED 
 
Lemma 6. When Pi
– „ Pi
+, the reservation price Pi* is smaller than Pi
+. 
Proof. By absurd reduction, when P* is higher or equal to Pi
+, the buyer acquires the product 
in the first shop he/she visits, being straightforward to see that the expected inverse utility is   7
equal to the average inverse utility. But by Lemma 5, the expected inverse utility is higher 
than the average inverse utility which implies P* must be always smaller than Pi
+. QED 
 
Lemma 7. If there is no price dispersion, P = P1
– = P1
+, and search cost is positive, then the 
reservation price P1* is equal to or higher than P. When search cost is zero, the reservation 
price P1* is equal to or smaller than P. 
Proof. When there is no price dispersion, the expected gain from the search is zero. Being so, 
when there is a positive search cost, it is optimal that the buyer acquires the product in the 
first shop he/she visits. In this way, the reservation price must assure that the buyer will not 
find a price higher than the reservation price. 
When search cost is zero, the buyer is indifferent between acquiring the product in the first 
shop he/she visits or to continue searching. In this way there remains uncertainty if the buyer 
acquires the product in the first shop he/she visits, P* = P, or if he/she continues searching 
forever, P* < P. 
It is not of relevance that the reservation price be multiple because it only means that the 
buyer  must acquire the product in the first shop he/she visits ( P1*  >  P) or that it is 
"algebraically" possible that the search continues forever (P1* < P). QED 
 
Lemma 8. If the buyer searches simultaneously for product 1 and product 2, visiting shops 
that sell both products, he/she will buy both products when he/she finds a sum of prices 
smaller than a reservation price P1+2* and individual prices are smaller than the reservation 
price P1* and P2*, respectively. Otherwise, the buyer acquire only the product i when Pi £ 
Pi*, continuing searching for the other product. P1+2* is smaller than P1* + P2* but higher 
than P1* and P2*. 
Proof. It is obvious that P1+2* is not greater than P1* + P2*, as the buyer may search the 
products separately. When buyer search simultaneously both products, after knowing both 
product prices affixed at one shop, he/she may i) acquire both products; ii) acquire one 
product and continuing searching for the other product or ii) do not acquire any product at all. 
Assuming that the buyer allocate the search cost part c to product 1 and the search cost part a 
to product 2:   8
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It may be interpret without loss that to search simultaneously both products is identical to 
search product 1 "with left hand", with cost search c, and to search product 2 "with right 
hand", with cost search a. Having this in mind it is straightforward to extend lemma 2 to both 
products: 
[ ] *) *, ( (.,.) 2 1 X P v V E =                   (14) 
The buyer acquires both product when pi £ Pi* and p1 + p2 £ P1* + X2*. 
From assumption 4, 0 < a < c, and lemma 3, the reservation price when product 2 is searched 
simultaneously with product 1, X2*, is lower than the reservation price when product 2 is 
searched alone, 0 < X2* < P2*. Naming P1+2* as the combined reservation price, it results: 
P1+2* = P1* + X2* < P1* + P2*                (15) 
The allocation of the combined search cost between product 1 and product 2 is "algebraic" so 
buyer will adopt the allocation that corresponds to the highest expected utility. In this way, 
the expected utility will not be smaller than the case considered which implies that P1+2* is 
always smaller than P1* + P2* and higher than P1* or P2*. QED 
 
Lemma 9. If the buyer searches both products simultaneously by visiting only shops that sell 
both products, his net expected inverse utility will be higher than if he/she searches in shops 
that are specialized in one of the products. 
Proof.  It results straightforward from lemma 8 that the net expected inverse utility when 
buyer searches simultaneously both products is higher than the net expected utility if the 
buyer searches one product at each time,  *) *, ( *) *, ( 2 1 2 1 P P V X P V > . But only when the buyer 
visits shops that sell both products he/she may search simultaneously the products. Being so, 
when he/she visits shops of that type his/her net expected utility is higher. QED 
   9
Lemma 10. Assuming only "new" buyers, the expected profit function of shops that sell both 
products is higher than shops that are specialized in one of the products. In this way, in 
equilibrium all shops sell both products. 
Proof. By lemma 9, when it is publicly known which are the shops that sell only one product, 
no "new" buyer will visit them, so their expected profit is zero. When that is unknown, on 
average, N/M buyers visit each shop. Assuming the more favorable case (unknown) for shops 
specialized in one product, their expected profit function is:  
[ ] * , ,.) ( 1 | ,.) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 P p p p q
M
N
p E £ " = p               (16) 
In this case, the expected profit function of shops that sell both products is: 
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Shops will affix prices that maximize their expected profit. By lemma 6, when shops act as 
monopolist they affix prices not lower than Pi*. Being so, shops specialized in one product 
affix the reservation price, being the expected profit  * *,.) ( 1 1 1 P P q
M
N
 while other shops set 
* *, *, 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 P p P p P p p £ £ = + + , being the expected profit 
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From this result and from assumption 7, in equilibrium, all shops sell both products. QED 
 
Lemma 11. The buyer acquires both goods at the first shop where he/she asks prices.  
Proof. From lemma 10, shops sell both products and, from lemma 9, buyers search both 
products simultaneously. As shops maximize the expected profit when they affix prices 
* *, *, 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 + = + £ £ P p p P p P p , the buyer acquires both products at the first shop he/she 
visits.  QED 
 
Corollary 2. All buyers that search are of the "new" type. 
Proof. As buyer acquires both products at the first shop he/she visits, there will be no buyer 
that acquires a product and continues searching for the other product. QED.   10 
 
Theorem 1. In multi-product market equilibrium, i) every shop sells both products and ii) 
there is no price dispersion. When search cost is positive, iii) buyers acquire both products at 
the first shop they visit and iv) shops act as if they where monopolists. When search cost is 
zero, v) buyers visit an indeterminate number of shops and vi) shops contest a la Bertrand. 
Proof. By lemma 10 and corollary 2, every shop sells both products and affixes the same 
combined price for the bundle, p1 + p2 = P1+2*. Being so, and by lemma 11, buyers acquire 
both products at the first shop they visit. If, by reduction to absurd, there is price dispersion, 
by lemma 9 no shop will set prices higher than P1* or P2* which is impossible because it 
violates lemma 6. If there is no price dispersion, lemma 9 is compatible with lemma 7. Being 
so and by lemma 7, when search cost is positive, in market equilibrium there is no price 
dispersion and shops act as if they where monopolist. Using the same lemma 7, it results that 
when search cost is zero, buyers visit an indeterminate number of shops so that the market is 
in "perfect competition" equilibrium. QED 
 
4. EXTENSION TO L PRODUCTS 
It is straightforward to extend assumptions, corollaries and theorem to the market with L 
products, L > 2, being all truth. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Although it seems fruitful to consider that buyers search simultaneously several products in 
the justification why in the trading of homogeneous goods there is persistent price dispersion 
and buyers search for the best price, I prove in this paper that it is not as fruitful as it seems. 
That is because the result of Diamond (1971) that there is neither price dispersion nor search 
stands when one considers several products market equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, there is one property of the theory that is in accordance with empirical data: 
buyers expected utility is higher when they visit shops that sell all products and those shops 
have a higher expected profit. This theoretical result is in accordance with the continuous 
increase in the number and dimension of larger shops commonly observed.    11 
Intuitively, it seems to me that to assume small magnitude search cost (assumption 6) does not 
change my main conclusion. That is because it is certain (lemma 3) that higher search costs 
will not increase search intensity (that is already zero for low search cost). 
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